The safety analysis of interlocking railway systems involves verifying freedom from collision, derailment and run-through (that is, trains rolling over wrongly-set points). Typically, various unrealistic assumptions are made in order to facilitate their analyses. In particular, trains are invariably assumed to be shorter than track segments; and generally only a very few trains are allowed to be introduced into the network under consideration.
Introduction
Formal verification of railway control software has been identified as one of the Grand Challenges of Computer Science [1] . As is typical with Formal Methods, this challenge comes in two parts: the first addresses the question of whether the mathematical models considered are legitimate representations of the physical systems of concern. The modelling of the systems, as well as of proof obligations, needs to be faithful. The second part is the question of how to utilize available technologies, for example model checking or theorem proving. Whichever verification process is adopted, it needs to be both e↵ective and e cient.
In a series of papers [2, 3, 4, 5] we have been developing a new modelling approach for railway interlockings. This work has been carried out in conjunction with railway engineers drawn from our industrial partner. By involving the railway engineers from the start, we benefit twofold: they provide realistic case studies, and they guide the modelling approach, ensuring that it is natural to the working engineer.
We base our approach on CSP||B [6] , which combines event-based with state-based modelling. This reflects the double nature of railway systems, which involves events such as train movements and -in the interlockingstate based reasoning. In this sense, CSP||B o↵ers the means for the natural modelling approach we strive for. The formal models are by design close to the domain models. To the domain expert, this provides traceability and ease of understanding. This addresses the first of the above stated challenges: faithful modelling. The validity of this claim was demonstrated in particular in [2] where a non-trivial case study -a complex double junction -was provided a model which was understandable and usable by our industrial partners.
In [3] we addressed the second challenge: that of how to e↵ectively and e ciently verify safety properties within our CSP||B models. To this end we developed a set of abstraction techniques for railway verification that allow the transformation of complex CSP||B models into less involved ones; we proved that these transformations are sound; and we demonstrated that they allow one to verify a variety of railway systems via model checking. The first set of abstractions reduces the number of trains that need to be considered in order to prove safety for an unbounded number of trains. Their correctness proof involves slicing of event traces. Essentially, these abstractions provide us with finite state models. The second set of abstractions simplifies the un-derlying track topology. Here, the correctness proof utilizes event abstraction specific to our application domain similar to the ones suggested by Winter in [7] . These abstractions make model checking faster.
Still present in these approaches, however, were assumptions that are made throughout the scientific literature, namely that the trains are shorter than the track segments in the network, and that only a very few trains will ever enter the network. In this paper we address these unrealistic assumptions. Firstly, we develop a modelling approach which incorporates train and track lengths, allowing trains to span any number of track segments. Secondly, we provide an abstraction technique which allows us to detect safety violations in networks involving an arbitrary number of trains by considering only two trains.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our modelling language CSP||B. In Section 3 we introduce railway concepts and our two case studies, and describe how they are modelled in CSP||B. In particular, we outline in detail the modelling of train and track lengths. In Section 4 we present our main result that considering two trains su ces in our analyses for safety properties. The application of our approach is presented in Section 5 via verification of our example scenarios. Finally, in Section 6 we put our work in the context of related approaches.
Background to CSP||B
The CSP||B approach allows us to specify communicating systems using a combination of the B-Method [8] and the process algebra CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes) [9] . The overall specification of a combined communicating system comprises two separate specifications: one given by a number of CSP process descriptions and the other by a collection of B machines. Our aim when using B and CSP is to factor out as much of the "data-rich" aspects of a system as possible into B machines. The B machines in our CSP||B approach are classical B machines, which are components containing state and operations on that state. The CSP||B theory [6] allows us to combine a number of CSP processes Ps in parallel with machines Ms to produce Ps k Ms which is the parallel combination of all the controllers and all the underlying machines. Such a parallel composition is meaningful because a B machine is itself interpretable as a CSP process whose event-traces are the possible execution sequences of its operations. The invoking of an operation of a B machine outside its precondition within such a trace is defined as divergence [10] . Therefore, our notion of consistency is that a combined communicating system Ps k Ms is divergence-free and also deadlock-free [6] .
A B machine consists of a collection of clauses and a collection of operations that query and modify the state. The machine clause declares the abstract machine and gives its name. The variables clause declares the variables that are used to carry the state information within the machine. The invariant clause gives the type of the variables, and more generally it also contains any other constraints on the allowable machine states. The initialisation clause determines the initial state of the machine. Operations of a B machine are given in the format
The declaration oo op(ii ) introduces the operation: it has name op, a (possibly empty) output list of variables oo, and a (possibly empty) input list of variables ii . The precondition of the operation is predicate P . This must give the type of any input variables, and can also give conditions on when the operation can be invoked. If it is invoked outside its precondition then divergence results. Finally, the body of the operation is S . This is a generalised substitution, which can consist of one or more assignment statements (in parallel) to update the state or assign to the output variables. Conditional statements and nondeterministic choice statements are also permitted in the body of the operation. In combined communicating systems we also define B machines that do not have operations and only contain sets, constants and invariants. These are included in order to provide contextual information to a system.
The language we use to describe the CSP processes for B machines is as follows:
The process Stop does not engage in any events, it represents deadlock. The process e?x !y ! P (x ) defines a channel communication where x represents all data variables on a channel, and y represents values being passed along a channel. Channel e is referred to as a machine channel as there is a corresponding operation in the controlled B machine with the signature x e(y). Therefore the input of the B operation y corresponds to the output from the CSP, and the output x of the B operation to the CSP input.
Here we have simplified the communication to have one output and one input but in general there can be any number of inputs and outputs. The external choice, P 1 2 P 2 , is initially prepared to behave either as P 1 or as P 2 , with the choice being made on occurrence of the first event in the environment. The internal choice, P 1 u P 2 , is similar, however, the choice is made by the process rather than the environment. Another form of choice is controlled by the value of a boolean expression in an if expression. The synchronous parallel operator, P 1 k P 2 , executes P 1 and P 2 concurrently, requiring them to synchronize on all events. The alphabetized parallel operator, P 1 A k B P 2 , requires synchronisation only in A \ B , allowing independent performance of events outside this set. The interleaving operator, P 1 ||| P 2 , allows concurrent processes to execute completely independently. Finally, N (exp) is a call to a process where N is the process name and exp is an expression.
For reasoning with CSP||B models we require the following notation:
• A system run (of a CSP||B model) of length n 0 is a finite sequence = hs 0 , e 0 , s 1 , e 1 , . . . , e n 1 , s n i where the s i , i = 0 . . . n, are states of the B machine, and the e i , 1  i  n 1, are events -either controlled by CSP and enabled in B when called, or B events. Here we assume that s 0 is a state after initialisation. Given a system run , we can extract its trace of events: events( ) = he 0 , . . . , e n 1 i. To demonstrate consistency of the combined CSP||B model we must consider every sequence of events in a system run that correspond to a single pass through the recursive definition of the CSP processes and verify that the matching sequence of B operations are called within their preconditions. In [6] we provided a general proof obligation that characterised this notion of succesful termination for sequences of operations. When this obligation is discharged for a particular CSP||B model this verifies the divergence-freedom of the combined system. In practice the proof obligation requires the identification of a control loop invariant which is a predicate between the variables of the B model and the parameters within the CSP processes and also predicates which must hold of the B model. Proof obligations in CSP||B have also been defined to characterise the condition for deadlock freedom [6] . In this paper we need not concern ourselves with ensuring deadlock freedom of the combined model since we only use events/operations which could give rise to a deadlock in the encoding of safety in Section 3.4.
• Given a trace of events tr we define its projection to a given set A:
hi A = hi; and (hei a t) A = ⇢ hei a (t A) ; e 2 A t A ; e / 2 A
Modelling Railways in CSP||B
Together with railway engineers, we have developed a common view of the information flow in railways. In physical terms, a railway consists of (at least) the four di↵erent components shown in Figure 1 .
• The Controller selects and releases routes for trains.
• The Interlocking serves as a safety mechanism with regards to the Controller and, in addition, controls and monitors the Track equipment.
• The Track equipment consists of elements such as signals, points, and track circuits. Signals can show the aspects green or red ; points can be in normal position (leading trains straight ahead) or in reverse position (leading trains to a di↵erent line); and track circuits detect if there is a train on a track.
• Finally, Trains have a driver who determines their behaviour.
For the purposes of modelling, we make the assumption that track equipment reacts instantly and is free of defects. The information flow shown in Figure 1 is as follows: the controller sends a request message to the interlocking to which the interlocking responds; the interlocking sends signalling information to the trains; and the trains inform the interlocking about their movements. The interlocking serves as the system's clock: messages can be exchanged once per cycle.
In this paper, we study two example track plans, one of which is a station illustrated in Figure 2 , the other being a single junction illustrated in Figure 3 . In both cases, the figures depict the scheme plan for the examples, each comprising of a track plan, a control table, and release tables. We explain our modelling approach here with reference to the station example of Figure 2 . In general, we adhere closely to the established principles laid out in [? ] . The track plan provides the topological information of the station which consists of 8 tracks (e.g., the track AA), three signals (e.g., S10), and two points (e.g., P101). Note that the tracks include entry and exit tracks on which trains can "appear" and "disappear". These two kinds of tracks are specially treated during verification.
An interlocking system gathers train locations, and sends out commands to control signal aspects and point positions. The control table determines how the station interlocking system sets signals and points. For each signal, there is one row describing the condition under which the signal can show proceed. There are two rows for signal S10: one for the main line (Route R10A) and one for the side line (Route R10B). For example, signal S10 for the main line can only show proceed when point P101 is in normal (straight) position and tracks AA, AB, AC, AD are all clear.
Note that we do not assume that trains are equipped with an Automatic Train Protection system which prevents trains from moving over a red light; thus overlaps are needed, e.g., the overlap for Route R10A is AD, and hence AD is included in the clear table.
The interlocking also allocates locks on points to particular route requests to keep them locked in position, and releases such locks when trains have passed. For example, the setting of Route R10A obtains a lock on point P101, and sets it to normal. The lock is released after the train has passed the point. The release tables store the relevant track.
In this setting, we consider three safety properties:
1. collision-freedom excludes two trains occupying the same track; 2. run-through says that whenever a train enters a point, the point is set to cater for this; e.g., when a train travels from track AD to track AE, point P102 is set so that it connects AD and AE (and not BD and AE); 3. no-derailment says that whenever a train occupies a point, the point doesn't move.
The correct design for the control table and release tables is safety-critical: mistakes can lead to a violation of any of the three safety properties.
Modelling short trains
As outlined in [2] , CSP||B caters for the double nature of railways by addressing the state and data aspects separately: the interlocking as the "data-rich" component is modelled as a single, dynamic B machine, the Interlocking machine. It represents the centralized control logic of a rail node, which reacts to its environment without taking any initiative. The Interlocking machine o↵ers to perform events in the form of operations to the two active system components: the controller and the trains, both of which are modelled as CSP processes.
The Trains and Controller processes run independently of each other, on the CSP level expressed with an interleaving operator -see Figure 4 (lines 26 and 28). It is an internal decision of the controller which routes are requested to be set or to be released (lines 2-4). Similarly, it is an internal decision of the train (driver) to stay or to move in front of a green signal (lines 12-14) or when there is no signal (line [21] [22] [23] . This logic is sometimes referred to as the driving rules of a train.
The Interlocking machine captures information about the location of trains on tracks using the function pos : TRAIN ! ALLTRACK . The machine also captures the current information about successor tracks through a dynamic function nextd which is dependent upon the position of the points. Furthermore, the machine captures information about signal settings using the function signalStatus and point settings using the sets: normalPoints and reversePoints. Finally, the current locks on points are modelled using currentLocks. The initial state of the model sets all tracks to being empty, all signals to red, all points to the normal position and no locks are made on points. This dynamic state is then updated and queried, respectively, in the four operations of the Interlocking machine. Figure 5 shows the full B code of a typical operation of the Interlocking machine. It describes how a release request from the controller is processed. The release is granted provided a number of conditions is fulfilled (the signal of the route is green, line 6, there are points locked for the route, line 8, etc.). In such a case, a number of state changes are made (the signal of the route is set to red, line 16, etc.) and the controller is notified with a "yes" (line 20). Otherwise, the state does not change and the controller is notified with a "no". Figure 6 shows the overall architecture of our modelling. The CSP controller and the Interlocking machine are independent of any particular scheme plan. They are supported by a Topology, a ControlTable, a ReleaseTable, and a Context machine. These four machines encode the scheme plan and are the parameters in our generic approach. Seen as B machines, these four supporting machines are stateless, and provide generic domain definitions. A typical example from the ControlTable machine which splits up the modelling of a control table into two relations and one function would be given as follows: As the CSP||B code is easy to read and moreover short, it is actually possible to discuss and to validate it with railway engineers. This is especially useful for discussing the algorithms underlying the four operations of the Interlocking machine which they confirmed to be correct. On their request, we removed an event from our model that should inform the train (driver) that there was no signal ahead. They also confirmed our insight of the dual nature of railways by stating that they actually developed and still use a programming language for interlockings which o↵ers primitives for manipulating both events and states.
The predicate used to define the relationship between the Interlocking machine and the CTRL process relates the train parameter t and train position pos the TRAIN CTRL process to the pos function within the Interlocking machine. This predicate must hold at each recursive call, and hence the system is divergence-free. 
CTRL

Modelling long trains
Until now we have relied on the assumption -universally, and generally implicitly, made in railway verification -that trains are shorter than track segments. Whilst unrealistic, this assumption allows much smaller models to be devised and, hence, analysed. Here we provide an approach which encompasses train and track lengths, making no assumptions about trains having to fit on track segments. For example, Figure 7 depicts a train spanning the three tracks AA, AB and AC. Specifically, the front of the train sits on track segment AC (↵ = AC), and has a distance df 0 to the next track segment AD; and the rear of the train sits on track segment AA (rr = AA), and has a distance dr 0 to the next track segment AB.
This approach allows fine-grained modelling of the distances that trains travel, as well as the times it takes to do so, and we have carried out such studies in the context of Timed CSP [11] . However, for the purposes of this paper -that is, verifying the safety of the rail network -we restrict attention to an untimed model in which state changes reflect the front or rear of the train either reaching or passing the end-points of track segments. There are thus four variables which define the state of the system: ↵ , rr , df and dr .
There are the following four situations in which a state change occurs, depending on a mutually-exclusive partitioning of the values of the distances df and dr . (The track segments named are in reference to (b) dr >df >0. This means that the front and rear of the train are each wholly within a track segment (the rear within AA and the front within AC), but with the front closer to its next track segment than the rear is to its. In this instance the state changes autonomously to that in which the front of the train moves to the end of its track segment (ie, the train moves forward a distance df ). The new values of the state variables are ↵ 0 =↵ , df 0 =0, rr 0 =rr and dr 0 =dr df .
(c) df 0 and dr =0. This means that the rear of the train is at the junction of two track segments (AA and AB). In this instance an event moverr .t.rr .rr 0 occurs representing the rear of the train t moving (instantaneously) from track segment AA to track segment AB. The new values of the state variables are ↵ 0 =↵ , df 0 =df , rr 0 =AB and dr 0 =length(AB ).
(Note that this corresponds to track circuit AA changing from "train detected" to "no train detected".) (d) df dr >0. This means that the front and rear of the train are each wholly within a track segment (the rear within AA and the front within AC), but with the rear at least as close to its next track segment as the front is to its. In this instance the state changes autonomously to that in which the rear of the train moves to the end of its track segment (ie, the train moves forward a distance dr ). The new values of the state variables are ↵ 0 =↵ , df 0 =df dr , rr 0 =rr and dr 0 =0.
As a note, in a finer-grained model cases (b) and (d) above -where neither end of the train is on an end-point of a track segment -would represent states where time elapses, allowing the train to move along a distance d < min(df , dr ), updating the state variables to be ↵ 0 =↵ , df 0 =df d , rr 0 =rr and dr 0 =dr d .
Signals and Overlaps
Unlike in [3] , we do not assume here the presence of Automatic Train Protection (ATP) preventing trains from overrunning red signals. Rather, we use the more realistic assumption that trains may overrun a red light but in such instances will stop on the next track segment.
A track section immediately following a signal (an overlap section) will therefore be protected by the signal preceding the one at the start of the section. As we are modelling "open" networks (ie, with entry and exit tracks), our B model will allow a train to enter an entry track only if the entry track and its overlap track are both clear.
A move↵ event will be enabled in the first two situations above, that is if (a) dr >df =0 or (b) dr >df >0; whereas a moverr event will be enabled in the latter two situations, that is if (c) df dr =0, or (d) df dr >0. The driving rules encoded into our model are then as follows:
(i) in front of a red signal, the train may either stay put, or it may overrun by one track and then stop;
(ii) in front of a green signal, the train may either move or it may stay put.
The behaviour of the train will only be dependent on signals in situation (a), and be modelled in CSP as follows.
Encoding safety
We describe here how the three safety properties are encoded in our B machine. Firstly, a collision is encoded as follows.
Here collision is detected when two di↵erent trains t 1 and t 2 occupy the same track segment (di↵erent from the EXIT and ENTRY tracks). This is recognised in the pos function which maps trains to the track segments they occupy; the collision condition will be enabled when the pos sets of the two trains have a nonempty intersection.
Next, run-through is modelled as follows. Here run-through is detected when a train t occupies nullTrack which is a special track segment introduced in our CSP model onto which a train is sent when it travels over an incorrectly-set point. Finally, derailment is modelled as follows. Here derailment is detected when the set of track segments currently occupied by trains includes segments which are associated with points that have moved while the trains have been on these segments. The complete CSP||B models for both case studies can be downloaded from http://www.cs.swan.ac.uk/RAIL/Models/CSPB.
Finitisation
In the following, we develop a theory of how to reduce the problem of verifying our CSP||B models of scheme plans for safety (i.e., freedom from collision, derailment, and run-through) to that of the two-train scenario. Given a scheme plan SP , and an unlimited collection TRAIN of trains with a function length : TRAIN ! N that assigns a length to each train, we write CSP || B(SP , TRAIN ) for the instantiation of our generic CSP||B model with SP and TRAIN . Note that in general CSP || B(SP , TRAIN ) is an infinite state system due to the inclusion of train identifiers into events and states. We call our theory "finitisation", as it reduces the safety problem over an infinite state system to a safety problem over a finite state system, namely to CSP || B(SP , TRAIN ) where the set of TRAIN contains two elements only.
Finitisation requires scheme plans to fulfil a number of well-formedness conditions as outlined in Section 4.1. For well-formed scheme plans we establish in Section 4.2 a reduction theorem (Theorem 3) w.r.t. the number of trains involved in a system run. If we are only interested in the movements of a finite set of trains in a given system run -say in the movements of two trains which collide in this system run -then we can define a new system run with "exactly the same movements" for just this selected set of trains. Finitisation works for well-formed scheme plans as it is possible to simulate the influence that one train can have on other trains by suitable route request and route release commands. The validity of this finitisation argument for safety is demonstrated in Section 4.3.
Well-formedness conditions
In our modelling approach, track plans are encoded in the Context and in the Topology machines in B . In these machines, tracks are collected in a set TRACK with special sets ENTRY , EXIT ✓ TRACK for the entry and exit tracks. Signals are collected in a set SIGNAL; homeSignal : SIGNAL ! TRACK defines the unique track at which a signal is placed; and the connectivity is given by a relation next ✓ TRACK ⇥ TRACK . One can see this structure as a directed graph (TRACK , next) with signals as labels on the nodes. With this notation, we define the concept of a topological route as a path through this graph, which begins after a signal and ends either with the track after the next signal or before an exit track.
Definition 1.
A topological route is a path R = ht 1 , . . . , t k i 2 TRACK + , k 1, in the graph (TRACK , next) such that the following holds:
• there is a signal s 2 SIGNAL and a track t 2 TRACK such that homeSignal (s) = t and (t, t 1 ) 2 next, and • either there is a signal s 2 Signal such that homeSignal (s) = t k 1 and for all 1  i  k 2 and s 2 SIGNAL it holds that homeSignal (s) 6 = t i ; or there is a track t 2 EXIT such that (t k , t) 2 next and for all 1  i  k and s 2 SIGNAL it holds that homeSignal (s) 6 = t i .
A track t belongs to a topological route R, written as t 2 R, i↵ t = t i for some 1  i  k . TopoRoute denotes the set of all topological routes of a track plan.
In Figure 2 , the path hAA, AB , AC , ADi is a topological route from the first track after signal S 10 to the first track after signal S 12; the path hAD, AE , AF i is a topological route from signal S 10 to the track just before the exit track Exit.
When designing a scheme plan, the signalling engineer selects and names some of the topological routes and develops control and release tables for them, i.e., there is a set ROUTE of route names and an injective map topo : ROUTE ! TopoRoute which assigns a topological route to each route name.
Definition 2.
A scheme plan is well-formed if the following conditions hold:
1. (Release-Table condition) Locks of a route can only be released by a train movement on that route: are distinguishable by at least one point position of these shared points: 8 r 1 , r 2 2 ROUTE : r 1 6 = r 2^s haredPoints(r 1 , r 2 ) 6 = ; ) (9 p 2 sharePoints(r 1 , r 2 ) : (p 2 reverseTable(r 1 )^p 2 normalTable(r 2 )) _ (p 2 reverseTable(r 2 )^p 2 normalTable(r 1 ))) The above conditions ensure a minimal consistency between the signalling of routes in the control and release tables on the one hand, and their topological extent as defined by the railway topology on the other hand. As demonstrated by the following example, however, this consistency is not enough to ensure safety. Example 1. Consider the following changes to the control table of the scheme plan shown in Figure 2 : for route R10A set point P 101 to be "reverse" rather than "normal", for route R10B set point P 101 to be "normal" rather than "reverse". In this changed setting all four conditions are fulfilled. The changed scheme plan however is not safe as trains can collide on track BC : Let there be no train in the beginning. Then route R10A can be set, and a train can travel from Entry over AA and AB to BC and stay on track BC . As BC is not in the clear part of route R10A, and there are no trains on the track named in the clear part of R10A, route R10A can be set again, and another train can travel along the same way. This second train will collide with the first one on track BC .
A reduction theory
We start the development of our reduction theory with a simple observation on our CSP||B models. If a signal shows green in a state of a system run, then there exists a uniquely determined route for which in the past a route request must have been granted by the interlocking. Theorem 1. Let be a system run of CSP || B(SP , TRAIN ) for a scheme plan SP and a set of trains TRAIN . Then the following holds for all signals sig 2 SIGNAL : prior to a state in which sig shows green, there is a uniquely determined event request.r .yes, r 2 ROUTE , in that caused the signal to become green. We sometimes speak of the uniquely determined route r that has been granted.
Proof. By definition of the B machine Interlocking, a signal is set to green only by the event request (when a route is successfully requested). Conversely, a signal is set to red only by the events move↵ and release (when a train passes a signal and when a route is released successfully).
Let S n , n 0, be a state of in which sig is green. Then, prior to S n , there must have been a last successful request to one of the routes r with signal (r ) = s (in S 0 , all signals show red). Moreover, after this request no train can have passed sig and there cannot have been a successful attempt to release r . Thus, the system run up to state S n has the following form: where signalStatus Sn (sig) = green, signalHome(sig) = t sig , (t sig , n sig ) 2 next, and id is a train identifier. Furthermore, any event between e k and e n inclusively cannot be request.r 0 .yes for a route r 0 2 ROUTE with signal (r 0 ) = sig. This is the case, as one condition in request.r 0 .yes requires signalStatus(sig) = red . Hence, no other route which shares this signal is set from S k to S n .
In the following we show that for every system run involving a set A]B of trains there exists a system run 0 which involves trains only from A, and where the trains from A move identically to . I.e., if trains from A collide in they collide in 0 , if a train in A derails in , it derails in 0 , if a train has a run-through in , the same happens in 0 . We obtain 0 constructively by defining a replacement function on events. To this end, we first identify those events which are related to B : Definition 3. Given a B be a set of train identifiers, we define the events of B as
The next step is to define the replacement function. This function is dependent on the current state as well: In the context of a system run, Theorem 1 guarantees the existence of a unique route r to be released, when we want to replace a forward move move↵ .b.cp.np in front of a green signal by a route release release.r .yes. Removing the trains in the set B from a system run also e↵ects the states of the B machine. For example, one component of a B machine state S is the map pos S : TRAIN ! ALLTRACK + , which stores for each train the sequence of tracks it occupies. If we now remove the trains B , we would hope that for the corresponding state T the following relation holds: pos T = pos S \ B ⇥ ALLTRACK + . In general, this correspondence between states is not only a projection on the the remaining trains. We define: 
for all r 2 ROUTE 
Condition (1) is as expected: the trains in the set B have been removed. Conditions (2) to (6) state that point positions and signal aspects are identical. Condition (7) states that the run without the trains in the set B either has the same locks for a route or none at all. Condition (8) stipulates that if a signal is green, there exists one route associated with the signal which is set. Finally, condition (9) says that the locks of any route that contains a track segment occupied by a train b 2 B in state S have been released in state T .
With these notations, we want to establish the following simulation properties: (a) Given a state S , a state T with T  B S , and an event e that is enabled in S we want that replace S (e) is enabled in T 0 . Furthermore, we 20 want that (b) the resulting states S 0 and T 0 to be in B correspondence, i.e., T 0  B S 0 . The following diagram illustrates this situation:
We establish these two properties in the following lemma: Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of . The base case is trivial, and the induction cases are generally unproblematic. However, due to the sheer number of cases to consider, the proof is relegated to Appendix A.
Lemma 1 allows us to extend the function replace B to system runs = hS 0 , e 1 , T 1 , . . . , e k , S k i as follows: replace B ( ) = hT 0 , replace B (S 0 , e 1 ), T 1 , . . . , replace B (S k 1 , e k ), T k i Here T 0 = S 0 (the initial state). Lemma 1 guarantees that it holds for all 1  i  k : replace B (S i 1 , e i ) is enabled in T i 1 and leads to T i and T i  S i .
With this result in place, we focus now on the question, if the events of replace B ( ) give a trace of the CSP controller: As the alphabets of the processes RW ( ), TRAIN CTRL( ), ERR and IDLE are disjoint, we can analyze the situation for the trace events( 0 ) by projection on these alphabets. First note that for the original trace we have that events( ) E ({i }) 2 traces(TRAIN OFF (i )) for all i 2 TRAIN . Here, E ({i }) is the set of events associated with train i , see Definition 3, and is the projection function defined in Section 2. With this result we obtain
• events( 0 ) E ({b}) = hi ✓ traces(TRAIN OFF (i )) (since we replace all events related to b 2 B ) and
From the definitions of RW (SP ), ERROR and IDLE , it follows directly that • events( 0 ) {| request, release |} 2 traces(RW (SP )) and
• events( 0 ) {| collision, derailment, runthrough |} 2 traces(RW (SP )).
Therefore, events( 0 ) 2 CTRL(SP , TRAIN \ B ).
Combining our two lemmas results in the following result. Proof. Let be a system run of CSP || B(SP , TRAIN ). By Lemma 1 we know that replace B ( ) is a run of the B machine M of CSP || B(SP , TRAIN \ B ), and we especially have events(replace B ( )) 2 traces(M ). By Lemma
Verification for safety
Our verification approach for CSP||B is to use model checking with ProB, where we check that in a given model a specific error event does not happen, i.e., it is never enabled.
Safety in the models with long trains is dependent on the train length involved, which motivates the following definition. A scheme plan SP is (n, L) e-free i↵ for all 2 CSP || B(SP , TRAIN ) it holds that e is not enabled in any state of where |TRAIN | = n and {length(t) | t 2 TRAIN } = L.
2.
A scheme plan SP is L-safe i↵ SP is (n, L) e-free for any n 2 N >0 and and e 2 ERROR.
Note that our definition of (n, L) e-free requires that 1  |L|  n.
We can now turn Theorem 2 into a proof method. The following Corollary is the basis of the main theoretical result of this paper. Proof. Assume that SP is not L-safe. This means there exists n 2 N >0 and e 2 ERROR such that SP is not (n, L) e-free. Then, there exists a run of CSP || B(SP , TRAIN ), |TRAIN | = n, such that e is enabled in some state of . Let = hS 0 , e 1 , S 1 , . . . , e k , S k i. Without loss of generality, let us assume that e is enabled in S k (10) 8 e 0 2 ERROR : e 0 is not enable in S 0 , . . . , S k 1
Case 1: e = collision.
Case 2: e = derailment.
(10) ) 9t 2 TRAIN , p 2 movedPoints S k : homePoint(p) 2 pos S k (t) ) e k is a request.r .yes by (11) ) trains in TRAIN do not cause collision in
where T k is the last state in replace TRAIN \{t 1 ,t 2 } ( ) ) p 2 movedPoint T k^h omePoint(p) 2 pos T k (t) ) derailment is enabled inT k ) SP is not (1, {length(t)}) derailment-free Case 2: e = run-through.
(10) ) 9t 2 TRAIN : nullTrack 2 pos S k (t)
) e k is a move↵ of t by (11) ) trains in TRAIN do not cause collision in
where T k is the last state in replace TRAIN \{t 1 ,t 2 } ( ) ) nullTrack 2 pos T k (t) ) run-through is enabled inT k ) SP is not (1, {length(t)}) run-through-free Corollary 1 works with di↵erent numbers of trains: two trains are needed in the case of collision, one train is needed otherwise. In order to be able to check safety for all three properties in one go, we prove the following.
Theorem 3. If a scheme plan SP is (n, L) e-free then SP is (n 0 , L 0 ) e-free for n 0 < n and L 0 ✓ L.
Proof. Assume SP is not (n 0 , L 0 ) e-safe, then there exists a run 2 CSP || B(SP , TRAIN 0 ), |TRAIN 0 | = n 0 , such that e is enabled in some state of . Then, is also a run of CSP || B(SP , TRAIN ), TRAIN 0 ✓ TRAIN , |TRAIN | = n and L 0 ✓ L = {length(t) | t 2 TRAIN }.
Experimental results
In this section we outline various experimental results carried out on our models. We used the ProB tool to check the validity of the following CTL formula:
AG(not(e(collision) _ e(runthrough) _ e(derailment)))
This formula is false if one of our ERROR events is enabled. In the CTL variant of ProB AG stands for "on all path is it globally true", e(a) stands for the enabledness of the event a.
Demonstration of errors
In order to demonstrate possible errors in a scheme plan, we provide two counter examples from the verification of the Station case study, presented in Figure 2 , where the control table is deliberately changed to contain errors. In these cases, counter examples are provided by ProB in terms of traces which contain an event from {collision, derailment, run-through}.
Example 2. In the first experiment, we swap the position of point P 101 for routes R10A (to reverse) and R10B (to normal) -like in Example 1 above. For this, ProB provides the following counter example:
henter .albert.Entry, request.R10A.yes, nextSignal .albert.green, move↵ .albert.Entry.AA, moverr .albert.Entry.AA, move↵ .albert.AA.AB , move↵ .albert.AB .BC , moverr .albert.AA.AB , moverr .albert.AB .BC , enter .bertie.Entry, request.R10A.yes, nextSignal .bertie.green, move↵ .bertie.Entry.AA, moverr .bertie.Entry.AA, move↵ .bertie.AA.AB , move↵ .bertie.AB .BC , collisioni which illustrates a collision caused by albert and bertie at BC . Example 3. In the second experiment, we swap the position of point P 102 for routes R12 (to reverse) and R112 (to normal). For this, ProB provides the following counter example:
henter .albert.Entry, request.R10A.yes, nextSignal .albert.green, move↵ .albert.Entry.AA, moverr .albert.Entry.AA, move↵ .albert.AA.AB , move↵ .albert.AB .AC , moverr .albert.AA.AB , moverr .albert.AB .AC , request.R12.yes, move↵ .albert.AC .AD, moverr .albert.AC .AD, move↵ .albert.AD.nullTrack , run-throughi which illustrates a run-through caused by albert.
Verification of the case studies
In this section we report on the verification results for safety of the single junction and station case studies. The experiments were carried out using ProB 1.3.6-final [12] to verify the collision, run-through and derailment freedom using CTL model checking over the CSP||B models. The models are built using our modelling approach as described in Section 3 where train and track lengths are taken into account. Thanks to the finitisation technique developed in Section 4, the CSP||B model of each case study requires only two trains for the verification of safety. In our example, we assume that train lengths can be either 40m (i.e., consisting of two coaches, each being 20m long) or 200m (i.e., consisting of ten coaches). To this end, for each case study, we performed three experiments which cover all possible combinations of train lengths from {40m, 200m}. The experiments were conducted on a PC with a quad-core 3.2GHz CPU and 8GB memory. The results are summarised in Figure 8 where for each experiment of a train length combination we report the number of states in the state space, the number of transitions in the state space, the size of used memory and the total running time. Figure 9 shows the verification results for the same case studies without modelling lengths. In these experiments, we consider two trains in the CSP||B models of the Station and the Single Junction case studies. Since train and track lengths are not included in the CSP||B models, only one experiment is carried out for each case study. These results show that the sizes of the CSP||B models increase when we take lengths of trains and tracks into account in our modelling approach.
Related work
The railway interlocking problem has long been studied by the Formal Methods community, and our work builds upon prior approaches to the modelling and verification of railways. Prominent studies from the B community include [13, 14, 15] whilst [16, 17] are classical contributions from process algebra and [18] uses techniques from Algebraic Specification. On a lower abstraction layer, [19, 20, 21, 22] verify the safety of interlocking programs with logical approaches.
Modelling comparison
Our modelling is most related to Winter's approach in CSP [23] and Abrial's modelling in Event-B [24] . In the following we briefly discuss their respective approaches and the manner in which we consider our approach to succeed in combining the successful aspects of these whilst avoiding their perceived deficiencies.
Winter [23] presents a generic, event-based railway model in CSP as well as generic formulations of two safety properties: CollisionFreedom and NoMovingPoints. Overall, this results in a generic architecture and a natural representation of two safety properties. Traceability, however, is limited. There are relations in the model which are derived from the control table. For example, the driving rule "trains stop at a red signal" is distributed over di↵erent parts of the model: it is a consequence of the fact that (1) the event "move to the first track protected by a signal" belongs to a specific synchronziation set and (2) a red signal does not o↵er this event. Purely event-based modelling leads to such decentralized control. Consequently, the model has no interlocking cycle.
Chapter 17 of the book by Abrial [24] gives an excellent detailed description and analysis of the railway domain, deriving a total of 39 di↵erent requirements. The modelling approach is generic, even though no concrete model is proven to be correct. Traceability in a tower of specifications can be complex for various reasons. For instance, a requirement can be the consequence of invariants from di↵erent levels. The relation between intended properties and the model remains an informal one. This is in contrast to other approaches (including Winter's and our own) which directly represent the intended property in the formal world and then prove that the modelled property is a mathematical consequence of the formal model. Furthermore, the approach is monolithic: behaviour is not attached to di↵erent entities to which they relate.
Winter et al. [7] allows a train to occupy two track segments, which is a concession to the assumption made elsewhere (including in our previous studies) that a train can only occupy one track segment. However, we noted in [2] that even this concession is too restrictive to be realistic. It is one of the novelties of our approach here that this assumption is discharged. The other novelty is the discharging of the assumption that only a very few trains my enter the network. This assumption is traditionally used to keep the state space of the analyses under control, with tools being stretched to allow the possibility of ever more trains running through the network. Using our approach, this assumption is no longer required, at least for safety analysis.
Verification comparison
The focus of our paper has been on safety verification using model checking in ProB. Model checking is becoming more recognised as an industrial technique [25] and therefore it is important to discuss it in the context of scalability. Ferrari et al. [19] state that model checking large interlocking systems is unfeasible with current state-of-the-art model checkers, in particular SPIN and NuSMV. However, Cimatti et al. [22] have demonstrated considerable success using NuSMV on industrial scale problems. James et al. [21] also demonstrate better results and the feasibility of the lower level approach involving program slicing. A detailed comparison with these approaches is not appropriate since our approach is at a higher level of abstraction. The justification for this higher level of abstraction is that the industrial partners wish to have feedback on interlocking systems already during the design stage.
Conclusion and future work
Through our association with Invensys Rail, we are working towards deriving railway models which are formal and analysable by current verification technologies, yet are fully faithful; we do not want to hide the engineering understandings held by our industrial partners in clever abstract encodings. Despite being expressed in the mathematical language of formal methods, our models must be immediately understandable -and verifiable -by our industrial partners.
This has proven to be a challenge, as we find that the extant approaches to railway modelling have been hindered in this respect by the framework in which they have been carried out. As explained above, modelling in the railway domain involves event-based components as well as state-based components. Using a solely-event-based framework or a solely-state-based framework succeeds in faithfully representing the relevant components, yet su↵ers in representing other components through encodings which -whilst clever feats of abstract modelling -are not easily appreciated by the working railway engineer.
Beyond the challenge of faithfully modelling railway systems, we have devised abstraction techniques that yield an e↵ective and e cient verification process based on model checking. In particular, ... We illustrated this process in terms of various scenarios. For (7), we have:
For any (r , p) 2 releaseTable(np), we have that np 2 topo(r ) by assumption 1. Furthermore, np 2 pos S (x ), by (9), we have that currentLocks T (r ) = ;, hence currentLocks T 0 (r ) = ;.
The event of this case moves the rear of a train in B , hence, no signal changes from red to green, then (8) follows immediate; and it is not moved into a new route, then, (9) holds for S 0 and T 0 .
• Case e = request.r .yes, then e 0 = request.r .yes. (5) and (7) ) e 0 is enabled in T T 0  S 0 : Since e and e 0 only change signalStatus(signal (r )), normalPoints, reversePoints, movedPoints, and currentLocks(r ), we only show (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) , (8): signalStatus T 0 (signal (r )) = green = signalStatus S 0 (signal (r )) by request.r .yes For (8), the existence is immediate by r . The uniqueness follows from Assumptions (3) and (4) that it is not possible to have 2 routes sharing signals since they must share points and the locks on these points must be di↵erent.
For (9) , any route r 0 such that t 2 topo(r 0 ) cannot be requested in S and T since assumption 2 and the fact that there is a train on its topology. Hence, r 0 6 = r , i.e., we do not change the locks by r 0 in S 0 .
• Case e = enter .x .t and x / 2 B , then e 0 = enter .x .t. e 0 is enabled in T :
e is enabled in S ) x / 2 dom(pos S )t 2 ENTRYn extd S (t) 2 emptyTracks S ) x / 2 dom(pos T )^by (1) t 2 ENTRYn extd T (t) 2 emptyTracks T by (1) and (2) ) e 0 is enabled in T T 0  S 0 : Since e and e 0 only change pos and movedPoints, we only show (1) and (7): T 0  S 0 : Since e and e 0 only change pos and movedPoints, we only show (1) and (7): T 0  S 0 : Since e and e 0 only change pos and movedPoints, we only show (1) and (7): • Case e = nextSignal .x and x / 2 B , then e 0 = nextSignal .x .
e 0 is enabled in T :
e is enabled in S ) first(pos S (x )) = ran(homeSignal (s)) ) first(pos T (x )) = ran(homeSignal (s)) by (1) and x / 2 B ) e 0 is enabled in T T 0  S 0 : The proof is trivial since e and e 0 only change movedPoint and movedPoints T 0 = movedPoints S 0 = ;.
• Case e = nextSignal .x and x 2 B , then e 0 = idle. e 0 is trivially enabled in T .
T 0  B S 0 : The proof is trivial since e and e 0 only change movedPoint and movedPoints T 0 = movedPoints S 0 = ;.
• Case e = release.r .yes, then e 0 = release.r .yes. 
